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In 2019, the Department of Justice (DOJ) expressly denounced 
medical professionals and executives who solicit or receive corrupt 
payments.1  In the DOJ’s view, these white-collar health care crimes are 
not victimless; they are indeed just as nefarious as any other criminal 
action.2  In fact, the DOJ believes these crimes cost American health care 
programs billions of dollars and announced that it will not tolerate 
health care providers who look to personally benefit from cheating the 
United States’ people and health care programs.3  Given the gravity of 
this issue, subsequent health risks to Americans, and the financial cost 
to the American health care system, the United States government, 
federal agencies, and state governments have pursued corrupt 
payments, such as illegal kickbacks and bribes, as aggressively as they 
have pursued health care fraud and abuse.4  There is little chance that 
federal agencies, especially the DOJ, will cease their intense enforcement 
actions in the future.5  	
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 1 See	generally	Press Release, Dep’t. of Just., Federal Indictments & Law 
Enforcement Actions in One of the Largest Health Care Fraud Schemes Involving 
Telemedicine and Durable Medical Equipment Marketing Executives Results in 
Charges Against 24 Individuals Responsible for Over $1.2 Billion in Losses (Apr. 9, 
2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-indictments-and-law-enforcement-
actions-one-largest-health-care-fraud-schemes.  
	 2	 Id. 
	 3	 Id.  
 4 Although fraud and abuse are often used interchangeably, there is a slight 
distinction. Fraud denotes deception and misrepresentations in order to benefit oneself, 
while abuse is when one engages in practices that are not sound, or fail to meet the 
standard of care. See	generally, ALICE G. GOSFIELD, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD AND ABUSE 
§ 1:2, Westlaw (database updated July 2020). 
	 5	 See Melissa Jampol & George Breen, DOJ’s	Health	Care	Enforcement	Initiative	Is	
Still	Going	Strong, LAW360 (July 19, 2018, 2:33 PM), 
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Although most health care providers generally engage in ethical 
behavior and provide high-quality patient-centric care, lawmakers 
realize that some unscrupulous providers attempt and sometimes 
succeed in exploiting government health care programs for their 
personal gain.6  The federal government has an interest in deterring 
illicit health care payments and activities, as it funds and runs six major 
health care programs.7   
In response, Congress enacted a full battery of statutes regulating 
the health care system, including but not limited to: the federal Anti-
Kickback Statute (AKS), the Health Care Fraud Statute, the False Claims 
Act, Exclusion Provisions, and the Civil Monetary Penalties law.8  Despite 
the number of federal health care fraud statutes, there is a noticeable 
gap in regulation of health care professionals soliciting or receiving 
corrupt payments for business referrals, goods, or services that are 
reimbursable under private insurance.9  Ultimately, this creates an 
obstacle for complete and successful regulation of health care providers.   
This gap in regulation becomes increasingly apparent in instances 
where health care providers have restructured their practices to 
exclude patients enrolled in government-payor programs and only 
accept patients with private-payor insurance.10  Government-payor 
programs cover approximately one-third of Americans, so one would 




 6 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., LAWS AGAINST 
HEALTH CARE FRAUD RESOURCE GUIDE 1 (2014), 
http://www.healthsmartmso.com/downloadfile/FWA/Care1stFWA/11%20-
%20FWA-Law%20Against%20Health%20Care%20Fraud.pdf. 
 7 COMM. ON ENHANCING FED. HEALTHCARE QUALITY PROGRAMS & INST. OF MED., LEADERSHIP 
BY EXAMPLE: COORDINATING GOVERNMENT ROLES IN IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY, 3 (Janet M. 
Corrigan et al. eds., Nat’l Acad. Press 2003). The six major health care programs funded 
by the federal government are: Medicare, Medicaid, the State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program, the Department of Defense TRICARE and TRICARE for Life 
programs, the Veterans Health Administration, and the Indian Health Service Program; 
Id at 2.  
	 8	 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2010); 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2009); 
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (1990); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (1998); DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES, supra	note 6 at 1. 
 9 Private health insurance providers include Humana, Cigna Health, and United 
Health. See	Alex Flitton, Top	25	Health	Insurance	Companies	in	the	U.S., PEOPLEKEEP BLOG 
(JAN. 13, 2020, 4:09 PM), https://www.peoplekeep.com/blog/top-25-health-insurance-
companies-in-the-u.s.  
 10 Private health insurance is purchased through companies such as United Health, 
Humana, Blue Cross Blue Shield, among others. This is not an exhaustive list of private 
health insurance providers.  See	 Susan Smith, The	Travel	Act:	Enforcing	Prohibitions	
Against	Referrals	Through	State	Bribery	Laws, WOLTERS KLUWER: HEALTH LAW DAILY WRAP 
UP (June 2, 2018) at 2.   
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beneficiaries from the six major government-payor programs: 
Medicare, Medicaid, the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, the 
Department of Defense TRICARE and TRICARE for Life programs, the 
Veterans Health Administration, and the Indian Health Services 
program.11  However, health care entities that accept government-payor 
program benefits experience increased legal scrutiny and are within 
federal jurisdiction under statutes such as the Anti-Kickback 
Statute(AKS), the False Claims Act, Stark Law, Exclusion Statute, and 
Civil Monetary Penalties Law.12   
When health care practitioners exclude government-payor 
program beneficiaries to escape possible legal sanctions, certain health 
care statutes, such as the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, are rendered 
ineffective, potentially placing illicit payment structures out of 
prosecutorial reach.13  The AKS prohibits and criminalizes transactions 
inducing or rewarding referrals for items and services billed to federal 
payor programs, and prohibits knowingly and willfully soliciting or 
receiving any remuneration in return for referring an individual to a 
service compensable under a federal health care program or purchasing 
any item compensable under a federal health care program.14  In 
addition, the AKS prohibits knowingly or willfully offering or paying any 
remuneration to a person for the same purpose of inducing services or 
items payable under a federal payor program.15  Since the AKS explicitly 
requires the remuneration in exchange for referrals of business, goods, 
and services to be one that is compensable under	a	federal	health	care	
program, the federal Anti-Kickback Statute becomes ineffective where 
no federal payor programs are affected.   
Congress recognized this limit on its traditional conduits for health 
care prosecutions, and recently enacted the Eliminating Kickbacks and 
Recovery Act (EKRA) to help eliminate corrupt payment practices, as 
well as to stop patient brokers who profit from the nationwide opioid 
epidemic.16  EKRA prohibits the knowing and willful solicitation, 
 
	 11	 See Health	Insurance	Coverage	of	the	Total	Population, THE KAISER FAMILY 
FOUNDATION,  https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-
population/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,
%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D#; NANCY NILES, BASICS OF THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, 
206-09 (3d ed. 2016).  
 12 Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare	Fraud	&	Abuse:	Prevent,	Detect,	
Report (Feb. 2019), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-
Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads/Fraud-Abuse-MLN4649244.pdf.  
 13 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b.  
 14 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1).  
 15 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2).  
 16 64 Cong. Rec. H9244 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2018) (statement of Rep. Frank Pallone) 
(explaining that patient brokers are individuals who target those with opioid use 
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receiving, paying, or offering renumeration, “directly or indirectly, . . . in 
return for referring a patient or patronage to a recovery home, clinical 
treatment facility, or laboratory” if those services are covered by a 
health care benefit program.17  EKRA’s statutory language is 
intentionally broader than AKS and is meant to address the current gap 
in prosecuting corrupt payments involving private insurance.18  
However, EKRA still falls short of fully covering the existing 
prosecutorial gap.  Specifically, EKRA is ineffective in instances where 
there is no recovery home, clinical treatment facility, or laboratory.  
However, this trend to create new tools to combat corrupt payments 
and practices within the health care sphere existed prior to EKRA’s 
enactment; the federal government targeted private-payor corrupt 
health care payment schemes with a relatively unknown sixty-year old 
statute, 18 U.S.C §1952 (The Travel Act).19  This Comment will delve into 
the implications of the federal government utilizing the Travel Act in 




Although the federal government has begun to utilize the Travel 
Act to punish individuals engaged in illicit health care transactions, 
Congress originally created the Travel Act to fight against  racketeering 
and corruption associated with organized crime.20  In 1961, Attorney 
General Robert F. Kennedy proposed 18 U.S.C §1952, “Interstate and 
foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering and enterprises” 
to punish individuals conducting interstate operations in furtherance of 
unlawful acts, such as, “gambling, prostitution, violent crime, untaxed 
liquor distribution, extortion, and bribery.”21  The text of §1952 
prohibits:  
 
disorders and refer them to substandard or fraudulent providers in exchange for 
kickbacks). 
 17 18 U.S.C § 220(a)(1)-(2) (2018).  
 18 Nick Oberheiden, 6	 Impacts	 on	 Laboratories,	 Clinics,	 and	 Other	 Treatment	
Facilities, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/6-
impacts-ekra-laboratories-clinics-and-other-treatment-facilities.  
 19 18 U.S.C § 1952 (2014); Jampol,	supra note 5. 
 20 Patrick D. Souter, The	Travel	Act:	Sixty‐Year	Old	“New”	Tool	in	Healthcare	Fraud	
Enforcement, ABA (May 1, 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/health_law/publications/aba_health_esource/
2017-2018/may2018/travelact/.  
 21 Smith, supra note 10, at 1; 18 U.S.C § 1952.  
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(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses 
the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with 
the intent to— 
(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or  
(2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful 
activity; or  
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or 
facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or 
carrying on, of any unlawful activity. . . .  
(b) As used in this section (i) “unlawful activity” means . . .  
(2) extortion, bribery, or arson in violation of the laws of 
the State in which committed or of the United States, or 
. . . .22 
With the rise in health care prosecutions under the Travel Act, 
many health care attorneys caution those in the field to parse federal 
statutes more carefully, and to focus on statutes beyond the traditional 
healthcare-related federal statutes.23 Irrespective of these well-
intentioned warnings, health care professionals and legal practitioners 
have not directly questioned whether the Travel Act is a proper tool to 
prosecute health care fraud and abuse in the first place.24   
The federal government’s decision to prosecute health care 
schemes under the Travel Act has raised several concerns, which 
include: prosecutors moving beyond the Travel Act’s original intent of 
prosecuting organized crime, the Act’s broad language, the 
government’s lack of interest in pursuing private-payor illegal 
remuneration schemes, and other potential issues.  This Comment will 
focus on these issues to ultimately determine whether the Travel Act’s 





 22 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)–(b).  
	 23	 See	generally, Matthew Hogan and B. Scott McBride, The	Government’s	Creative	Use	
of	 the	 Travel	 Act	 in	 Healthcare	 Fraud	 Prosecutions, MORGAN LEWIS (May 22, 2019), 
https://www.morganlewis.com/blogs/healthlawscan/2019/05/the-governments-
creative-use-of-the-travel-act-in-healthcare-fraud-prosecutions.  
 24 The first noted use of the Travel Act in healthcare abuse and fraud prosecution 
was in 2013. See, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD & 
ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM: ANN. REP. FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013,	24 (Feb. 2014). 
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III. Analysis		
A. PRELIMINARY ISSUES  
1. Moving	Beyond	The	Travel	Act’s	Legislative	Intent	
Into	the	Health	Care	Sphere		
When Congress enacted the Travel Act, it was “the most 
controversial and important statute within [Attorney General Robert F.] 
Kennedy’s organized crime package proposal,” and was a smaller piece 
of a greater movement and legislative program directed toward 
dismantling  organized crime.25  Congress targeted organized crime’s 
intricate interstate structure because state government resources were 
inadequate to deal with the complex and interstate nature of multiparty 
organized crime.26   
i. The Travel Act’s Origins  
In an effort to thwart interstate organized crime, Kennedy 
proposed the Travel Act to enable the federal government to aid local 
law enforcement authorities.27  The Act was deemed  “necessary to aid 
local law enforcement officials in instances where ‘the “top men” of a 
given criminal operation resided in one state but conducted their illegal 
activities in another.’”28  Overall, Congress’ primary motivation for 
enacting § 1952 was to quell organized crime.   
ii. Can Prosecutors Read the Travel Act Broadly Outside its 
Organized Crime Context?  
Due to the Travel Act’s broad language, it covers a number of 
crimes traditionally considered outside of the organized crime 
 
 25 Souter, supra note 20 (citing Attorney	General’s	Program	to	Crush	Organized	Crime	
and	Racketeering:	Hearing	on	Legislation	Involving	Organized	Crime	before	H.	Comm.	on	
the	Judiciary, 87th Cong. (1961) (Statement of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy)); 
see	 also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 41 (1979) (discussing the Travel Act’s 
legislative history). 
	 26	 Perrin, 444 U.S. at 41 (citing Legislation	Relating	to	Organized	Crime:	Hearing	on	
H.R.	468,	H.R.	1246,	etc.,	before	Subcommittee	No.	5	of	the	H.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary, 87th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); see	also United States v. Ferber, 966 F.Supp. 90, 101 (D. Mass. 
1997) (quoting United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 291 (1969) (quoting S. Rep. No. 
644, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961)). 
 27 United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 679 (2d  Cir. 1973) (citing S.Rep. No.644, at 
4 (1961)). 
	 28	 Id. (quoting Attorney	 General’s	 Program	 to	 Crush	 Organized	 Crime	 and	
Racketeering:	 Hearings	 on	 S.1653‐1658	 before	 S.	 Judiciary	 Comm. 87th Cong. 15-17 
(1961) (Statement of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy)). 
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context.29  The Supreme Court defended the Travel Act’s non-traditional, 
or off-brand use, in Perrin	 v.	 United	 States.30  The Perrin Court 
understood the Travel Act to reflect Congress’s clear and deliberate 
intent to alter the federal-state balance in order to enforce the Travel 
Act’s underlying predicate state bribery statutes.31  The Supreme Court 
did not differentiate between bribery statutes related to organized 
crime and more general bribery statutes. Rather, the Court spoke 
broadly about Congress’s motivation to enforce violations of state law 
within federal statutes.32  As such, the government may utilize the Travel 
Act in health care prosecutions.   
In United	States	v.	Le	Faivre, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit noted that even if it was desirable or wise to limit the 
Travel Act to organized crime, the court lacks the authority to make that 
determination.33 Courts play a judicial role, and, as such, it is 
inappropriate to enter the legislative sphere.  Congress has the power to 
create and to define the Travel Act’s dictates, and it decided not to limit 
the statute to organized crime.34  Beyond that, courts should not prevent 
prosecutors from charging Travel Act violations in health care corrupt 
payment prosecutions.   
2. The	Federal	Government’s	Interest	in	Pursuing	
Private‐Payor	Schemes		
In 2019, the federal government spent almost 1.2 trillion dollars on 
health care.35  In order to protect this enormous government 
expenditure, the federal government and its agencies have organized 
strike force teams to investigate and prosecute those who manipulate 
the system for their own pecuniary benefit.36  Given the amount of 
money at stake and the number of health care programs the government 
 
	 29	 See	generally Souter,	supra note 20 (discussing how the Travel Act had recently 
been used in health care abuse and fraud prosecutions).  
	 30	 Perrin, 444 U.S. at 50. 
	 31	 Id. 
	 32	 Id.  
 33 United States v. Le Faivre, 507 F.2d 1288, 1293-94 (4th Cir. 1974). 
	 34	 See	18 U.S.C.	§ 1952 (2014).  
 35 Tax Policy Center, How	Much	Does	the	Federal	Government	Spend	on	Health	Care?,		
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-much-does-federal-
government-spend-health-care (last visited Mar. 25, 2021) (“Of that, Medicare claimed 
roughly $644 billion, Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Pro-gram (CHIP) 
about $427 billion, and veterans’ medical care about $80 billion.”).  
	 36	 See DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, STRIKE FORCE OPERATIONS (2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/strike-force-operations (last visited Apr. 5, 
2021).  
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administers,37 the federal government’s interest is obvious in regards to 
government-payor programs.  However, some legal commentators have 
recognized the aggressive position the Department of Justice is taking in 
punishing schemes involving private‐payor items and services.38  
Accordingly, this raises issues regarding the appropriateness of the 
federal government’s interest in fraudulent private-payor schemes.   
i. The Government’s Interest in Corrupt Payments and 
Fraud and Abuse Schemes involving Private-Payor 
Health Care Programs  
Unlike the federal Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) which only targets 
corrupt payments associated with government-payor programs, the 
Travel Act does not require a connection between the illegal 
remuneration and a federal health care program.  Rather, the Travel Act 
criminalizes unlawful activities more broadly, such as corrupt 
payments.39  The Act punishes those who travel in interstate commerce 
or use the mail or facilities in interstate commerce with the intent to 
engage in unlawful activity.40   
However, the federal government’s interest in recovering money 
from illicit health care schemes also extends to the private-payor 
context.  An argument implying the government should not involve itself 
in the private-payor context because it does not pay the bill fails to 
recognize the health care system’s important, life-sustaining nature.  In 
addition, the federal government seeks to punish nefarious health care 
providers, as it does with any other criminal actor.41  Prosecutors should 
be able to pursue these providers regardless of whether their illegal 
activities involve a private-payor or a government-payor because illicit 
action and corruption in health care is a major threat to the system as a 
whole.42  It should not matter who pays the bill.   
Moreover, the Travel Act is neither the first, nor the only example 
of the federal government voicing its interest in preventing and 
investigating health care fraud and abuse involving private-payors.  In 
September 2012, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
 
	 37	 See INST. OF MED., supra	note 7, at 3.  
	 38	 See Johnathan N. Halpern & Ilenna J. Stein,	Hospitals,	Doctors	(and	Others)	Beware:	
DOJ	May	Apply	Travel	Act	to	Healthcare	Prosecutions, HOLLAND & KNIGHT (Apr. 25, 2019),	
https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2019/04/hospitals-doctors-and-
others-beware-doj-may-apply-travel-act. 
	 39	 See 18 U.S.C. § 1952. 
	 40	 Id.   
	 41	 See	generally Dep’t. of Justice, supra note 1.  
	 42	 See U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES & DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD 
AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 10 (May 2019).  
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(HHS) Secretary and the U.S. Attorney General signed the Health Care 
Fraud Prevention Partnership (HFPP) Charter, which established a data 
sharing project between the public sector and private health care 
insurance industry.43  The HFPP Charter strives to improve detection 
and prevention of health care fraud through a private-public sector data 
exchange, and to provide a forum for private and public leaders to share 
practices and methods to detect and prevent health care fraud.44  This 
coordinated effort highlights the government’s interest in stopping 
unlawful activities within private-payor programs and the importance 
of pursuing and punishing health care fraud and abuse within the 
private health insurance realm.   
ii. Increased Federal Resources Expended in Travel Act 
Cases 
Although the federal government does have an interest in 
prosecuting corrupt payment schemes involving private-payor 
insurance, is the increased expenditure of federal resources to assist in 
state enforcement efforts justified?   
In Perrin	v.	United	States,	the Court reflected upon the Travel Act’s 
history, and recognized Congress’s desire to reference existing state law 
in defining the Travel Act. 45  Congress intended to add a second layer of 
enforcement because state enforcement officials’ efforts were often 
unsuccessful.46  State governments simply lacked the necessary means 
to pursue organized crime leaders who lived in one state but carried out 
their illicit activities in different states.47   
Just as state and local governments needed the Travel Act to target 
organized crime with federal resources, the federal government may 
supplement the states’ resources to address illegal conduct within the 
health care sphere.  Section 1952 helps federal agencies, such as the DOJ, 
 
 43 About	 the	 Partnership, THE HEALTHCARE FRAUD PREVENTION PARTNERSHIP, 
https://hfpp.cms.gov/about/background.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2021). Currently, 
HFPP’s members include five federal partners, including the U.S. Department of Defense, 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and U.S. Department of Labor, as well as 
ninety-two private insurance carriers. Current	 Partners, THE HEALTHCARE FRAUD 
PREVENTION PARTNERSHIP, https://www.cms.gov/hfpp/about/current-partners (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2021). 
	 44	 About	 the	 Partnership, HEALTHCARE FRAUD PREVENTION PARTNERSHIP, 
https://hfpp.cms.gov/about.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2021). 
 45 Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1979). 
	 46	 Id. at 42.  
	 47	 See	generally	United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 679 (2nd  Cir. 1973)  (citing 
Attorney	General’s	Program	to	Crush	Organized	Crime	and	Racketeering:	Hearing	before	
Sen.	Judiciary	Comm. 87 Cong. 15-17 (1961) (Statement of Attorney General Robert F. 
Kennedy)). 
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pursue their interests in prioritizing health care fraud and abuse, even 
if it is a departure from the government’s ordinary charging theories.  
And, the DOJ is not the sole agency interested in prosecuting health care 
bribes and kickback schemes—the DOJ also coordinates with state, 
federal, private and public partners to ameliorate this issue because 
“healthcare fraud affects everyone.”48  In the end, the health care 
system’s public importance allows the federal government to employ 
vast amounts of resources to ferret out kickbacks in the private-payor 
context.49   
B. TRAVEL ACT ISSUES IN PRACTICE: CASE STUDIES  
Recent developments in New Jersey, Texas, and Florida illustrate 
the rise of the Travel Act as a powerful tool in health care prosecutions.  
These cases, involving millions of dollars and numerous defendants, 
indicate that courts recognize the Travel Act as a viable instrument to 
punish individuals engaged in corrupt payment practices in the health 
care system.   
1. The	Biodiagnostic	Laboratory	Services	Scheme		
Beginning in March 2006 and lasting until approximately April 
2013, Biodiagnostic Laboratory Services (BLS), a New Jersey-based lab, 
routinely paid physicians bribes to induce them to refer their blood 
samples from Medicare and private-payor beneficiaries to BLS for 
testing.50  These actions resulted in convictions of fifty-three defendants, 
including thirty-eight doctors, namely Dr. Greenspan and Dr. Ostrager.51   
i. United States v. Greenspan  
Dr. Greenspan, one of the doctors charged, accepted bribes from 
BLS in exchange for referring out his patients’ blood tests to BLS.52  He 
was convicted under the Travel Act and the federal Anti-Kickback 
 
 48 Denise O. Simpson, Health	Care	Programs	and	Fighting	Healthcare	Fraud	in	United	
States	of	America, 64 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN 1, 5-6 (2016). 
 49 Smith, supra note 10 at 2. 
 50 Indictment at 4, United States v. Greenspan,	No. 2:16-cr-00114-WHW (D.N.J. Mar. 
8, 2016).  
 51 Although there are fifty-three defendants convicted in the BLS scheme, this 
Comment will focus on defendants Greenspan and Ostrager, as they were indicted and 
filed motions challenging the use of the Travel Act. See Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice, 
President of New Jersey Clinical Laboratory and His Brother, A Senior Employee, 
Sentenced to Provision in $100m+ Test Referral/Bribery Scheme (June 13, 2018),  
https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/president-new-jersey-clinical-laboratory-and-
his-brother-senior-employee-sentenced-prison.   
 52 United States v. Greenspan, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108856, at *45 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 
2016). 
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Statute (AKS) for accepting bribes within a long-running BLS scheme.53  
Over the course of the scheme, Greenspan received $200,000 in bribes 
from BLS “in the form of sham rental checks, service agreement[s], and 
consultant payments.”54  Dr. Greenspan was indicted under both the AKS 
and the Travel Act due to the scheme involving both government and 
private insurance beneficiaries.55  For the referrals of the Medicare 
patients’ blood specimens to BLS for testing, Dr. Greenspan was charged 
with violations of the federal Anti-Kickback Statute.56  For the portion of 
the scheme that involved referring privately insured patients’ blood 
samples to BLS, Dr. Greenspan was charged under the Travel Act.57   
ii. United States v. Ostrager  
Another defendant involved in the BLS scheme was Dr. Bret 
Ostrager, a doctor from Nassau County, New York.58  From 2011 to 2013, 
Ostrager accepted monthly cash bribes of approximately $3,300 per 
month and other valuable items as bribes for referring his Medicare and 
privately insured patients to BLS.59  The referrals that Ostrager 
generated enabled BLS to collect approximately $909,000 from 
Medicare and private insurers.60  Because the illicit payments that 
Ostrager received within the BLS scheme involved both government-
payor beneficiaries and private-payor patients, federal prosecutors 
charged Ostrager with violations of both the Anti-Kickback Statute and 
the Travel Act.61   
 
 53 Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice, Bergen County Doctor Convicted of Taking Bribes 
in Test-Referral Scheme with New Jersey Clinical Lab (Mar. 6, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/bergen-county-doctor-convicted-taking-bribes-
test-referral-scheme-new-jersey-clinical-lab (announcing that Greenspan was 
convicted of one count of conspiring to commit violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute, 
the Federal Travel Act and wire fraud, three substantive violations of the Anti-Kickback 
Statute, three substantive violations of the federal Travel Act, and three substantive 
violations of wire fraud).  
 54 Dep’t. of Justice, supra note 53. 
 55 Defendant was also indicted on Honest Services Fraud, which is outside the scope 
of this Comment; See Indictment, supra	note 50.  
 56 Indictment,	supra note 50, at 16.  
	 57	 Id. at 18.  
 58 Indictment at 4, United States v. Ostrager,	No. 2:15-cr-00399-SRC (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 
2015).  
	 59	 Id. at 4-5, 7.  
	 60	 Id. at 5; see	also Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice, New York Doctor Sentenced to 37 
Months in Prison For Taking Bribes in Test-Referral Scheme with New Jersey Clinical 
Lab (June 8, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/new-york-doctor-sentenced-
37-months-prison-taking-bribes-test-referral-scheme-new-jersey. 
 61 Indictment, supra	note 58, at 11-14.  
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2. The	Forest	Park	Medical	Center	Scheme		
The federal government has also prosecuted defendants who opted 
out of government-payor programs entirely to avoid punishment.  In 
2016, federal prosecutors charged twenty-one defendants, including 
physicians, advertising executives, health care executives, and one 
attorney, with Travel Act violations in the Northern District of Texas 
case, United	 States	 v.	 Beauchamp.62  Beauchamp involved a kickback 
scheme where Forest Park Medical Center (FPMC), a physician-owned 
hospital, paid more than $40 million in bribes and kickbacks to induce 
physicians to use the hospital.63 The DOJ asserted that the FPMC 
conspiracy consisted of three prongs: (1) maximizing FPMC’s patient’s 
insurance reimbursement by refusing to join certain low-reimbursing 
insurance plan networks; (2) maximizing patient referrals by paying 
kickbacks to physicians; and (3) disguising the scheme as a legitimate 
transaction through sham business ventures.64  The scheme centered on 
defendants choosing only to treat those with high-reimbursing 
commercial insurance plans at FPMC, and transferring lower-
reimbursing, mostly government-payor, beneficiaries in exchange for 
cash.65  Most of the kickbacks in the FPMC scheme were disguised as 
consulting or marketing fees, but were actually corrupt payments 
distributed to doctors based on the percentage of surgeries each doctor 
referred to FPMC.66  FPMC’s hospital manager, Alan Beauchamp, 
testified that FPMC “bought surgeries” from doctors, and then 
Beauchamp “papered it up to make it look good.”67  Legal commentators 
have suggested that the prosecutors’ use of the Travel Act in the FPMC 
case serves as a reminder that health care providers who do not accept 
 
 62 Jonathan S. Feld, Monica B. Wilkinson, Lea F. Courington, & Alison L. Carruthers, 
The	Rise	of	the	Travel	Act, L. J. NEWSLETTERS (Oct. 2017). 
 63 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Seven Guilty in Forest Park Healthcare Fraud 
Trial (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndtx/pr/seven-guilty-forest-park-
healthcare-fraud-trial; Brett Barnett & Nesko Radovic, DOJ’s	 Travel	 Act	 Prosecution	
Yields	Convictions	for	Kickbacks	Involving	Private	Payors, MCGUIRE WOODS LLP (May 28, 
2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/doj-s-travel-act-prosecution-yields-
78519/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2021). 
 64 David J. Edquist et al., Forest	Park	Medical	Center	and	the	Travel	Act:	Different	
Road,	Same	Destination, NAT’L L. REV., (Apr. 23, 2019), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/forest-park-medical-center-and-travel-act-
different-road-same-destination.  
 65 Feld, supra	note 62 (citing Indictment, United States v. Beauchamp, No. 3-16cr-
0516D (N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2016)).  
 66 U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, supra note 63 
 67 U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, supra note 63 
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Medicare or Medicaid beneficiaries and engage in sham arrangements 
to disguise physician referrals are still at risk of federal prosecution.68   
In the FPMC scheme, the Travel Act proved useful in prosecuting 
parts of the scheme that did not violate the federal Anti-Kickback 
Statute; prosecutors were only able to charge violations of the federal 
Anti-Kickback Statute against those who “knowingly” received or 
solicited illegal renumerations in connection with government-payor 
beneficiaries.69  Out of the twenty-one defendants, seven were found 
guilty of violating the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, ten pled guilty 
before trial, and two of the defendants were found guilty of Travel Act 
violations.70  Without the Travel Act, certain actors in this gross abuse of 
the health care system – amounting to 40 million dollars in illicit 
payments – would have gone unpunished.   
3. The	Delray	Beach	Patient	Brokering	Scheme		
In United	 States	 v.	 Snyder, defendant Eric Snyder established a 
substance abuse treatment center for individuals suffering from drug 
and alcohol addiction.71  In order to bring residents to the center, the 
defendant provided kickbacks and bribes in the form of “free or reduced 
rent, payment for travel, and other benefits.”72  Defendants further paid 
“patient brokers” kickbacks for referring clients to the treatment 
center.73  On top of these bribes and kickbacks, Snyder paid doctors to 
order expensive urine drug screenings so that private insurance 
providers would reimburse Snyder for the tests.74  Unlike the cases 
mentioned above, there was no federal-payor program involved in 
Synder, so the indictment could not, and did not, contain any federal 
Anti-Kickback Statute charges, but did include Travel Act charges.75  As 
 
 68 Edqusit et al., supra note 64.  
 69 Feld, supra	note 62. 
	 70	 Healthcare	 Fraud	 Update:	 The	 Forest	 Park	 Medical	 Center	 Case	 and	 Federal	
Enforcement	 of	 Private	 Insurance	 Referrals, SBEMP ATTORNEYS, 
https://sbemp.com/healthcare-fraud-update-the-forest-park-medical-center-case-
and-federal-enforcement-of-private-insurance-referrals/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2021). 
 71 Indictment at 14, United States v. Snyder, No. 18-cr-80111-ROSENBERG (S.D. Fla. 
Jun. 7, 2018).  
	 72	 Id.   
 73 Id. at 14; Id.	 at 20; “Patient brokering” or “body brokering” refers to the 
unscrupulous doctors in the opioid and drug treatment business who refer patients to a 
facility in return for a generous kickback; See Partnership to End Addiction, What	 to	
Look	For	—	and	what	to	Avoid	–	When	Searching	For	an	Addiction	Treatment	Program, 
https://drugfree.org/article/what-to-look-for-and-what-to-avoid-when-looking-for-
an-addiction-treatment-program/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).  
	 74	 Id.	at 16-20.	 
	 75	 Id. at 19.	 
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in the BLS and FPMC schemes, Snyder	provides another illustration for 
why prosecutors need the Travel Act—to pursue individuals engaged in 
illicit remuneration schemes that cannot be charged under traditional 
health care corrupt payment statutes.76   
C. THE TRAVEL ACT IN THE HEALTH CARE REALM   
In light of the Travel Act’s original purpose and legislative history, 
some may feel uncomfortable with applying this statute to health care 
prosecutions, such as those mentioned in the above case studies.  After 
all, the Travel Act is aptly named “Interstate and foreign travel or 
transportation in aid of racketing and enterprises.”77  But, a statute’s 
title is not dispositive nor is it part of the statutory text.78  A title may be 
persuasive, but it is not a substitute for the detailed provisions of the 
text.79  In fact, the Second and Sixth Circuits have recognized that it 
would be “beyond the proper exercise of judicial powers for courts to 
confine the Travel Act to its title.”80  If the legislators meant for the 
statute to apply strictly to organized crime, drafters should have added 
limiting language.   
The Travel Act was originally intended to impede the travel of 
persons engaged in illegal business or other unlawful activity and target 
actors who lived in one state and operated illicit operations elsewhere. 
81  As such, the statutory intent is consistent with federal prosecutors’ 
new method to charge Travel Act violations where health care providers 






 76 The Travel Act was an especially necessary prosecutorial tool because Snyder was 
charged in June 2018 prior to EKRA’s October 2018 enactment, which addressed 
corrupt patient-brokering practices.	See Indictment, supra note 71; See 18 U.S.C. §220.  
 77 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2014). 
	 78	 See, Larry M. Eig, Statutory	Interpretation:	General	Principles	and	Recent	Trends, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1, 35-36 (2014). 
	 79	 Id.  
 80 United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 680 (2d Cir. 1973) (citing Fraser v. United 
States, 145 F.2d 139, 142 (6th Cir. 1944)). 
 81 Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 811 (1971) (citing S. Rep. No. 644, at 2-3 
(1961)).  
	 82	 E.g.,	Def’s Memorandum of Law to Dismiss Charges and Other Relief, United States 
v. Ostrager, Crim. No. 15-399 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2015) (charging a New York doctor with a 
Travel Act violation when he sent his New York patient’s blood panels to a New Jersey 
lab).  
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1. The	Travel	Act	as	the	Federal	Government’s	Gap	
Filler		
The Travel Act is an important prosecutorial tool that allows the 
federal government to reach health care providers who refuse to accept 
Medicare and Medicaid patients and benefits in an attempt to 
circumvent AKS sanctions.83  The federal government and its agencies 
have a keen interest in prosecuting private-payor health care fraud due 
to the troubling trend of health care providers not enrolling in Medicare 
or Medicaid, and/or referring Medicare or Medicaid patients to other 
providers in exchange for cash or other compensation. 84  Unlike the 
federal Anti-Kickback Statute, the Travel Act’s breadth allows federal 
prosecutors to pursue health care fraud and abuse cases outside the 
government-payor system.  But, this leaves open the question: is the 
Travel Act too broad for health care prosecutions?  
From a textual perspective, the Travel Act’s “broadness” is derived 
from its definition of “unlawful activity.”85  “Unlawful activity” 
encompasses “extortion, bribery, or arson in violation of the laws of the 
State in which committed …”86  Such an interpretation allows for state 
commercial bribery laws to serve as a predicate for Travel Act 
violations, and substantially impacts the health care sphere.87  The 
statute’s language is broad on its face, which clearly allows prosecutors 
to pursue health care schemes that involve a violation or an intent to 
violate a state commercial bribery statute in connection with an 
interstate facility.88   
The Travel Act’s rise in popularity is credited not only to its breadth 
and significance as a powerful prosecutorial tool, but also as a result of 
the noticeable gaps in the federal Anti-Kickback Statute. The Travel Act 
allows prosecutors to bypass the government-payor requirement and 
extends federal jurisdiction over private-payor illegal kickback 
schemes.  Rather than criticizing this increase in federal power, the rise 
of the Travel Act should serve as a reminder to health care providers, 
 
	 83	 E.g., Indictment, United States v. Beauchamp, No. 3-16cr-0516D (N.D. Tex. Nov. 
16, 2016) (charging Travel Act violations when defendant refused to accept government 
healthcare program beneficiaries).  
	 84	 See	Smith, supra note 10 at 5; see	also Dep’t. of Health and Human Services, Office 
of Inspector General, Advisory Opinion No. 13-03 (June 7, 2013) (stating that the OIG 
explicitly denounces agreements where healthcare professionals have either refused to 
accept or “carved out” federal payor recipients from otherwise “questionable financial 
agreements.”).  
	 85	 See	18 U.S.C. § 1952(b) (2014). 
 86 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(2).  
	 87	 See	Barnett, supra note 63.  
	 88	 See	generally, Indictment, supra note 50, at 6; Indictment,	supra note 83, at 33.  
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“that patients – not payments – should guide decisions about how and 
where doctors administer treatment.”89  In essence, federal prosecutors 
regard the Travel Act as an appropriate way to eliminate AKS’s legal 
loophole.90  However, the Travel Act is not a font of unlimited power.  
Like the AKS, the government does not have a free pass to prosecute any 
suspicious health care arrangement involving private health insurance.   
2. State	Commercial	Bribery	Statutes	as	Limits	on	the	
Travel	Act	in	Health	Care	Prosecutions		
As previously stated, § 1952 prohibits travel in interstate 
commerce with the intent to commit an “unlawful activity.”91  In the 
health care prosecution context, “unlawful activity” is typically defined 
under a state commercial bribery statute, but not all states have a 
commercial bribery statute.92  Currently, ten states do not have a 
commercial bribery statute or a related statute that satisfies § 1952’s 
“unlawful activity” element.93  That begs the question—are Travel Act 
prosecutions truly fair if the charges depend on whether an individual 
is in a state with a commercial bribery statute?  And beyond that, does 
the fact that each state has substantively different commercial bribery 
statutes still lead to potentially unequal prosecutions?   
The Texas Commercial Bribery Statute (TCBS) served as the state 
law predicate in the Forest Park Medical Center scheme.94  Prosecutors 
charged individuals, including Dr. Beauchamp, under the Travel Act 
because they used interstate facilities, namely interstate banking 
systems and emails, with the intent to violate the TCBS.95  The TCBS 
makes it unlawful for a fiduciary, without the consent of the beneficiary, 
to “intentionally or knowingly solicit[], accept[], or agree[] to accept any 
benefit from another person on agreement or understanding that the 
benefit will influence the conduct of the fiduciary in relation to the 
affairs of his beneficiary.”96  As such, state commercial bribery statutes, 
 
 89 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra note 63.   
 90 Smith,	supra note 10, at 2. 
 91 18 U.S.C. § 1952.  
 92 Smith, supra note 10, at 3.  
 93 Smith, supra note 10, at 3. The ten states that do not have a state commercial 
bribery statute are: Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, 
Tennessee, West Virginia and Wyoming. Interestingly enough, one state, California, has 
multiple state commercial bribery statutes.  
 94 Indictment, supra	note 83, at 33-34. 
	 95	 Id.  
 96 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.43 (West 2019).   
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such as TCBS, cabin possible Travel Act violations to those who have a 
fiduciary duty to their beneficiaries.97   
Similar to Texas, New Jersey also has a commercial bribery statute. 
N.J.S.A. § 2C:21-10 states a “person commits a crime if he solicits, accepts 
or agrees to accept any benefit as consideration for knowingly violating 
or agreeing to violate a duty of fidelity to which he is subject as …  a . . . 
physician.”98  In U.S.	v.	Greenspan, the defendant accepted bribes from 
Biodiagnostic Laboratory Services (BLS) in exchange for referring out 
his patients’ blood tests to BLS.99  By accepting this consideration, Dr. 
Greenspan broke his fiduciary duty because New Jersey physician 
regulations expressly prohibit physicians from accepting bribes.100   
Although Greenspan is a relatively simple application of the Travel 
Act, the decision does not address the question of whether a doctor from 
one state has a fiduciary duty under another state’s commercial bribery 
statute.101  The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
in Ostrager	answered this question in the affirmative, and denied the 
defendant-physician’s motion to dismiss a Travel Act violation.102  As 
previously mentioned, Ostrager arose out of the larger Biodiagnostic 
Laboratory Services (BLS) scheme.  In Ostrager, the defendant argued 
he did not owe the fiduciary duty required under the New Jersey State 
Commercial Bribery Statute because he is a New York doctor with no 
New Jersey ties.103  But, the court held that the government’s allegation 
of express quid	pro	quo conduct, i.e. the payment in exchange for sending 
the patient to a particular facility, was enough to deny the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss.104  The court understood this case to involve a New 
York doctor who made the conscious decision to send his patient’s blood 
panels to a New Jersey lab, BLS, in return for compensation, and 
accepted compensation through a New Jersey-based bank.105  These 
actions were enough to meet the “bribery  . . . in violation of the laws of 
the State in which committed” element under § 1952.106   
 
 97 Under § 32.43(a)(2)(C), physicians are named as a fiduciary.  
 98 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-10 (1979). 
 99 United States v. Greenspan, No. 16-114 (WHW), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108856, at 
*48 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2016).  
	 100	 Id.  
	 101	 Id. at *2-3.  
 102 Transcript of Oral Argument Part B at 14-15, United States v. Ostrager, Crim. No. 
15-399 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2015).  
 103 Def’s Memorandum of Law to Dismiss Charges and Other Relief at 4, United States 
v. Ostrager, Crim. No. 15-399 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2015). 
 104 Transcript of Oral Argument Part B at 18-19, United States v. Ostrager, Crim. No. 
15-399 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2015). 
	 105	 Id. at 12, 19-20.  
	 106	 See 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2014).  
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In short, Ostrager broke his fiduciary duty under N.J.S.A. § 2C:21-
10 when he engaged in self-dealing and used his position and 
connections in New Jersey to further his personal interest, rather than 
acting in his patients’ best interest.107  The court held Ostrager should 
have been on notice that the New Jersey Commercial Bribery Statute 
would govern his conduct due to his exchange with a New Jersey lab.108  
Ostrager’s self-interested interaction with the lab allowed a 
jurisdictional basis for New Jersey district courts and, consequently, the 
federal government under § 1952, to impose sanctions on Ostrager.109   
The Texas and New Jersey District Courts found the state law 
predicate violation and interstate nexus sufficient for the Travel Act, but 
United	States	v.	Snyder illustrates what occurs when prosecutors charge 
an insufficient state law predicate.  In Snyder, the alleged interstate 
nexus was the purchase of plane tickets to bring the clients to the 
substance abuse treatment center.110  However, the defendant moved to 
have the Travel Act count dismissed, arguing the Florida Patient 
Brokering Statute (Fla. Stat. § 817.505) was not a proper state law 
predicate and did not govern his actions.111  Section 817.505 prohibits 
health care facilities from offering kickbacks to induce patient referrals 
to a health care facility.112  Snyder argued that the Florida Patient 
Brokering Statute was not an appropriate state law predicate for the 
Travel Act, as § 1952 does not include “kickbacks” as an “unlawful 
activity.”113  Rather, the Travel Act defines “unlawful activity” as 
“extortion, bribery, or arson in violation of the laws of the State in which 
committed.”114  The defendant criticized the government’s attempt to 
expand the Travel Act’s definition of “unlawful activity” to include 
“kickbacks,” and sought to stop the government from claiming that 
“bribery” and “kickbacks” are synonymous.115   
 
 107 Transcript of Oral Argument Part B at 26, United States v. Ostrager, Crim. No. 15-
399 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2015). 
	 108	 Id. at 38.  
	 109	 Id. at 20.   
 110 Indictment,	supra note 71, at 20.  
 111 Reply to Gov’t Consolidated Response to Snyder’s Mot. to Dismiss Travel Act 
Counts at 1-2, United States v. Snyder, No. 18-cr-80111-ROSENBERG (S.D. Fla. July 1, 
2019).  
 112 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.505 (2020).  
 113 Reply to Gov’t Consolidated Response to Snyder’s Mot. to Dismiss Travel Act 
Counts at 2, United States v. Snyder, No. 18-cr-80111-ROSENBERG (S.D. Fla. July 1, 
2019). 
 114 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2014).  
 115 Reply to Gov’t Consolidated Response to Snyder’s Mot. to Dismiss Travel Act 
Counts at 2, United States v. Snyder, No. 18-cr-80111-ROSENBERG (S.D. Fla. July 1, 
2019). 
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Snyder	illustrates the Travel Act’s limits. Although the case ended 
in a plea agreement, the government ultimately dismissed the Travel Act 
charge.116  There is a good reason to believe the Travel Act violation 
would not have withstood judicial scrutiny because the Florida Patient 
Brokering Statute is not a state law governing “unlawful activity.”  
Patient brokering kickbacks do not meet the Travel Act’s statutory 
definition of “unlawful activity,” even if kickbacks are considered 
unlawful in other legal contexts.   
In Snyder,	the proper state law predicate may have been the Florida 
Commercial Bribery Statute. However, the statute did not apply to 
Snyder’s situation.117  The Florida Commercial Bribery Statute requires 
a “public servant” to be engaged in the alleged misconduct, and Snyder, 
as a substance abuse treatment center owner, is clearly not a public 
servant.118  Although it is somewhat speculative,	the outcome in Snyder 
illustrates that the Travel Act is not an infinite source of power in health 
care prosecutions.  The Travel Act has limits—namely that a proper 
state law predicate must be charged.   
D. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES  
Due to the Travel Act’s heavy reliance on state law and the great 
deal of overlap with other federal statutes, a proper inquiry into the 
questions of federalism, preemption, and double jeopardy must be 
evaluated. One prominent lingering question that arises after evaluating 
Greenspan, Beauchamp, and Snyder	 is whether federal prosecutors 
should be able to use state laws to confer federal jurisdiction over a 
case?   
1. Federal	Auxiliary	Criminal	Jurisdiction	and	
Federalism	Concerns		
Because the Travel Act’s language includes a state law predicate to 
confer federal jurisdiction, there is the unanswered question as to 
whether the Travel Act takes federal criminal law beyond its reasonable 
bounds and disrupts the delicate federalism balance.  Even outside the 
 
 116 Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Snyder, No. 18-cr-80111-ROSENBERG (S.D. 
Fla. July 23, 2019).  
 117 There is the possibility that the federal prosecutors charged Snyder with 
violations of the Patient Brokering Statute because the prosecutors may not have had 
the same intimate familiarity with state commercial bribery statutes as they do with 
federal statutes.  
 118 Reply to Gov’t Consolidated Response to Snyder’s Mot. to Dismiss Travel Act 
Counts at 2, United States v. Snyder, No. 18-cr-80111-ROSENBERG (S.D. Fla. July 1, 
2019); Complaint at 2, United States v. Snyder, No. 18-cr-80111-ROSENBERG (S.D. Fla. 
July 11, 2017). 
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Travel Act context, there is widespread concern that “federal auxiliary 
criminal jurisdiction” has become so prevalent that all local offenses 
become federal crimes if some distinctive federal involvement or 
attribute is present.119  Section 1952’s interstate element, however, 
dismisses federalism-based concerns, and makes federal jurisdiction 
and the use of federal resources appropriate. After all, the government 
is simply using its constitutional power “to prohibit activities of 
traditional state and local concern that also have an interstate nexus.”120  
In United	States	v.	Goldfarb, the court held “[t]he overriding federal 
nature of the Travel Act dictates that an offense thereunder is primarily 
federal in nature[,]” and “[t]he gravamen of the offense is the interstate 
nexus,” not the state commercial bribery statute.121  Although the 
defendant in Goldfarb claimed there was no Travel Act violation because 
the state law (absent the Travel Act charge) violated his constitutional 
rights, the court rejected this argument because a state law’s 
constitutionality does not bear on the Travel Act violation.122  Rather, 
the state law serves as a predicate for a Travel Act violation, and “there 
is no need to prove a violation of state law as an essential element of 
federal crime.”123  Goldfarb	gives credence to the proposition that the 
Travel Act is a federal offense wholly separate from the underlying state 
law predicate, which allows the government to confer federal 
jurisdiction and resources.   
Similarly, the Northern Texas District Court concluded the Travel 
Act does not violate federalism principles because a commercial 
bribery statute violation (or intent to violate) coupled with an 
interstate nexus is a valid federal concern.124 As such, the court did not 
dismiss the defendant’s Travel Act charge and rejected the defendant’s 
 
	 119	 See United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 678 (2d Cir. 1973) (citing N. Abrams, 
Consultant’s	Report	 on	 Jurisdiction, 1 Working	 Papers	 of	 the	National	 Commission	 on	
Reform	of	Federal	Criminal	Laws, 33, 36 (1970)). Abrams’ work discusses the possibility 
that the federal government can now involve itself in all types of substantive criminal 
prosecution so long as there is some distinctive federal involvement, such as interstate 
commerce, travel, or facilities. See	 N. Abrams	 Consultant’s	 Report	 on	 Jurisdiction, 1 
Working	Papers	of	the	National	Commission	on	Reform	of	Federal	Criminal	Laws 36-37 
(1970). His work also proposes the idea that the Travel Act is the logical limit of this 
idea. Id.	
 120 Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). The validity of Congress’ power 
under the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution is outside this Comment’s scope.   
 121 United States v. Goldfarb, 464 F. Supp. 565, 574 (E.D. Mich. 1979).  
	 122	 Id.	 
	 123	 Id. (citing United States  v. Prince, 515 F.2d 564, 566 (5th Cir. 1975); United States 
v. Nardello 393 U.S. 286, 292 (1959); United States v. Conway, 507 F.2d 1047, 1051 (5th 
Cir. 1975)).  
 124 United States v. Barker, No. 3:16-CR-516-D, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152475, at *45 
(N.D. Tex., Sept. 20, 2017).  
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argument that the Travel Act unconstitutionally altered the federal-
state balance and ran afoul of federalism principles.125   
 
i. Is the Travel Act’s Interstate Nexus Too Tenuous to 
Confer Federal Jurisdiction?  
Concerns involving the Travel Act’s interstate nexus are nothing 
new. In 1971, the Supreme Court	 questioned and addressed the 
widespread implications of an aggressive use of the Travel Act in Rewis	
v.	United	States.126  The Rewis Court reasoned that § 1952’s legislative 
history discusses punishing organized crime syndicates, but the 
legislative record is silent beyond that.127  The Court interpreted that 
silence as intentional, and concluded that if the Travel Act was to apply 
to “criminal activity solely because that activity is at times patronized 
by persons from another State,” then Congress would have addressed 
that possibility.128  Moreover, the Court reasoned Congress would have 
certainly recognized that an expansive Travel Act potentially “could 
alter sensitive federal-state relationships, could overextend limited 
federal police resources, and might produce situations in which the 
geographic origin of customers, a matter of happenstance, would 
transform relatively minor state offenses into federal felonies.”129   
However, this criticism is not applicable to utilizing the Travel Act 
for health care prosecutions. The issue in Rewis centered on defendants 
charged with violating the Travel Act because of “a matter of 
happenstance.”130  It just so happened that actors who wanted to 
participate in the defendant’s illegal Florida lottery traveled over the 
nearby Florida-Georgia line.131 In contrast, in health care corrupt 
payment cases, the interstate travel or use of interstate facilities is not  
“a matter of happenstance,” rather health care professionals make the 
conscious decision to use interstate facilities to further their unlawful 
actions in violation of state commercial bribery statutes.132   
 
	 125	 Id. 
	 126	 See Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971). 
	 127	 Id.	at 811-12.  
	 128	 Id. Notably, in United	States	v.	Archer, the court said if the Travel Act’s language 
was read literally the act would cover “a $10 payment to fix a traffic ticket if only the 
person desiring the fix walked across a state line to pay off the policeman.” United States 
v. Archer,	486 F.2d 670, 679 (2d Cir. 1973).   
	 129	 Rewis, 401 U.S. at 812.   
	 130	 See	id.  
	 131	 Id. at 810. 
	 132	 See	generally	United States v. Barker, No. 3:16-CR-516-D, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
152475, at *14-15 (N.D. Tex., Sept. 20, 2017). 
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ii. Interstate Nexus in	Greenspan	and Beauchamp:  
In Greenspan, a New Jersey District Court judge held an indictment 
correctly alleged a Travel Act violation and denied defendant’s motion 
to dismiss, accordingly.133  The indictment charged defendant-physician 
with violating the Travel Act because he traveled in interstate commerce 
and used the mail and facilities of interstate commerce in furtherance of 
acts of commercial bribery that violated the New Jersey Bribery statute, 
N.J.S.A. § 2C:21-10.134  The court denied Greenspan’s motion to dismiss 
because he violated the Travel Act when he received compensation via 
an interstate bank wire for blood tests after he received a consulting 
agreement check, a text message in connection with payment for 
defendant’s holiday party, and a text message in connection with the 
delivery of a “consulting agreement” payment.135  The defendant’s travel 
in interstate commerce with the intent to distribute the proceeds of any 
“unlawful activity,” as defined by the New Jersey Commercial Bribery 
statute, was enough to charge a Travel Act violation and to withstand 
judicial scrutiny on a motion to dismiss.136   
Similarly, in Beauchamp, prosecutors correctly utilized the Texas 
Commercial Bribery Statute predicate to satisfy § 1952.137  The Texas 
Commercial Bribery Statute makes it unlawful for a fiduciary “without 
the consent of his beneficiary, [to] intentionally or knowingly solicit[], 
accept[], or agree[] to accept any benefit from another person on 
agreement or understanding that the benefit will influence the conduct 
of the fiduciary in relation to the affairs of his beneficiary.”138  Forest 
Park Medical Center allegedly paid money to physicians in exchange for 
patient referrals, which violated the Texas Commercial Bribery 
Statute.139  And because the bribe was paid through an interstate 
banking system, the government could properly allege a Travel Act 
 
 133 United States v. Greenspan, No. 16-114 (WHW), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108856, at 
*51-52 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2016).  
	 134	 Id. at *44; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-10 (1986) (“A person commits a crime if he 
solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit as consideration for knowingly violating 
or agreeing to violate a duty of fidelity to which he is subject as … [a] . . . physician”). 
	 135	 Greenspan, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108856, at *14, *63.  
	 136	 Id. at *42, *44, *51. 
 137 Indictment, supra	 note 83, at 32-33; See Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice, 14 
Defendants Sentenced to 74+ Years in Forest Park Healthcare Fraud (Mar. 19, 2021), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndtx/pr/14-defendants-sentenced-74-years-forest-
park-healthcare-fraud.  
 138 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.43(b) (West 2019). Section 32.43(a) lists various 
professions, such as physicians, as fiduciaries.  
	 139	 See	Indictment, supra	note 83, at 33-36.  
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violation.140  In these corrupt payment Travel Act cases, the interstate 
nexus was not too attenuated, as the interstate facilities used in both 
Greenspan	 and Beauchamp	 were integral to the completion of their 
respective schemes.141  Because the use of interstate facilities in these 
cases is neither “a matter of happenstance” nor coincidence, the Travel 
Act reliance on interstate facilities for the interstate nexus to confer 
federal jurisdiction is justified.   
2. Preemption	Concerns		
A Travel Act violation depends heavily on its state commercial 
bribery statute predicate.  But there may be a conflict between the 
federal Anti-Kickback Statute and the state commercial bribery statute, 
which may result in the state law being preempted.142  Therefore, if the 
state commercial bribery statute is preempted by the AKS, then a Travel 
Act violation must be dismissed, as it fails to state the required state law 
predicate.  AKS can preempt a state commercial bribery statute in three 
possible ways: (1) express preemption; (2) field preemption; or (3) 
conflict preemption.143  Express preemption occurs when Congress has 
pre-empted state authority “by so stating in explicit terms.”144  However, 
there is no federal preemption provision in AKS.  Therefore, conduct 
that is lawful under AKS may still be illegal under state law.145  Field 
preemption occurs where the “scheme of federal regulation [is] . . . so 
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no 
room for the States to supplement it.”146  The AKS does not preempt 
state commercial bribery statutes because each statute regulates 
different conduct and people, thus the state and federal statute do not 
occupy the same field.147  Nothing in the AKS indicates that Congress 
intended to make the statute the sole means of prosecuting health care 
 
 140 Indictment, supra note 83, at 33-36.  
	 141	 See	Indictment, supra	note 83, at 33-36; See	also	United States v. Greenspan, No. 
16-114 (WHW), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108856 at 42-51.  
	 142	 See United States v. Barker, No. 3:16-CR-516-D, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152475, at 
*9-12 (N.D. Tex., Sept. 20, 2017) (holding the federal law under the AKS does not 
preempt the Texas Commercial Bribery Statute).  
 143 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 416 U.S. 190, 
203-04 (1983).  
	 144	 Id.	at 203.	 
 145 United States v. Barker, No. 3:16-CR-516-D, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152475, at *10 
(N.D. Tex., Sept. 20, 2017).  
 146 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 416 U.S. 190, 
204 (1983). 
 147 United States v. Barker, No. 3:16-CR-516-D, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152475, at 
*11(N.D. Tex., Sept. 20, 2017).  
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fraud.148  In fact, the long history of the AKS peacefully co-existing with 
other similar state statutes implies the opposite.149  Finally, there is no 
conflict preemption because it is not impossible to comply with both the 
state commercial bribery statute and the AKS.150  It is actually quite easy 
to comply with both laws—simply do not engage in conduct that is 
illegal under the state commercial bribery statute, even if it is legal 
under AKS.   
3. Double	Jeopardy	Concerns		
When deciding how to charge individuals in corrupt health care 
payment cases, prosecutors may use any combination of the Travel Act, 
the state commercial bribery statute, and the federal Anti-Kickback 
Statute.151  Given the similarities between these three charges, health 
care defense attorneys and defendants view the Travel Act as “nothing 
more than a veiled attempt by the Government to add volume - but not 
substance to its case.”152		Arguably,	it is quite possible this prosecutorial 
method implicates the “second bite at the apple” theory.153 However, a 
closer look at the statutory text resolves these qualms.  	
One must first recognize that the underlying state commercial 
bribery predicate involves different elements than the Travel Act itself.  
Under the Travel Act, the prescribed conduct is the “use[] [of] interstate 
facilities with the [requisite] intent to . . . promote [some] unlawful 
activity.”154  This is separate from the bare commission of acts which 
violate state law.155  Section 1952 embodies “a clear Congressional 
determination, not to proscribe the underlying state substantive 
offense, but rather to prohibit the use of interstate facilities with the 
intention of promoting the substantive state offense.”156  As such, the 
federal interest exists solely because of the use of interstate facilities, 
 
	 148	 Id.  
	 149	 Id.  
 150 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 416 U.S. 190, 
204 (1983). 
	 151	 See generally, United States v. Greenspan, No. 16-114 (WHW), 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 108856 at *56-58 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2016) (charging all three violations).  
	 152	 Id. at *42 (quoting ECF No. 7-12).   
 153 “Second bite at the apple” is an idiom meaning that one is given a second chance 
or opportunity to do the same thing.  Critics of the Travel Act argue that it gives 
prosecutors a second (or third) chance to try their case, if their initial charges are not 
successful. See	generally Smith, supra note 10, at 5.  
 154 McIntosh v. United States, 385 F.2d 274, 275 (8th Cir. 1967). 
	 155	 Id. at 275-76.	 
	 156	 Id. at 278.  
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not because the state crime was committed.157  In fact, the Travel Act 
does not even require consummation of the state offense, which makes 
a § 1952 violation noticeably different than a stand-alone state law 
violation.158  Ultimately, the fact that a state can prosecute commercial 
bribery does not impinge upon a federal prosecutor’s ability to charge a 
Travel Act violation.   
As mentioned above, in United	 States	 v.	 Greenspan, Dr. Bernard 
Greenspan was indicted for his participation in a bribery and kickback 
scheme.159  Since the remuneration scheme involved both a 
government-payor and privately-insured patients, Greenspan was 
indicted on both the federal Anti-Kickback Statute and Travel Act 
charges.160  Defendant argued that these charges were “impermissibly 
multiplicitous” and must be dismissed.161  However, the Greenspan	
Court was not convinced and recognized defendants can be subjected to 
multiple prosecutions for the same conduct if Congress’s intent was to 
impose multiple punishments for that conduct.162   
In particular, Greenspan	 addresses the double jeopardy issues 
arising from the concern that the Travel Act and the AKS charges are 
premised on the same act or transaction.163  The Greenspan	 Court 
recognized this concern and allowed prosecutors to pursue both the 
Travel Act and the AKS charges for the same act or transaction so long 
as each statute requires a proof of fact that the other does not.164  
Prosecutors must be cognizant of an important limit—they “may not 
divide up ‘one unit of prosecution’ into pieces and convict a defendant 
separately of each piece.”165  The court held that the prosecutors were 
 
 157 The federal government’s concern with interstate facilities is entrenched in 
Constitution Law principles outside this Comment’s scope. 
	 158	 McIntosh, 385 F.2d at 276.  
 159 United States v. Greenspan, No. 16-114 (WHW), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108856, at 
*40-41 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2016).  
	 160	 See Id. at *13. Defendant was also charged under the Honest Services Fraud 
statute, but that is outside the parameters of this Comment and does not change the AKS 
and Travel Act analysis.	 
	 161	 Id. at *56-57.  
	 162	 Id.	at *57 (citing United States v. Rigas, 605 F.3d 194, 204 (3d Cir. 2010)).  
 163 Id. at *57-58; The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment states, “No 
person shall . . . be subject to the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”; 
U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
	 164	 Id. at *56-58 (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)). 
	 165	 Id.	at *58; A historic example of “dividing up prosecution,” is the 1777 English 
Case, Crepps v. Durden. Crepps was a baker who was convicted of four violations of a 
statute prohibiting a person “exercising his ordinary calling on a Sunday,” because he 
sold four loaves of bread on a Sunday. It was improper that he was charged with four 
separate violations for the unitary course of conduct. See United States v. Lacy, 446 F.3d 
448, 456 (3d Cir. 2006)(citing Crepps v. Durden, (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B.)).  
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not punishing Greenspan multiple times for one unit of acts, which 
would trigger double jeopardy concerns.166  Rather, the government 
accused Greenspan of different individual acts because the bribes 
Greenspan was charged with under AKS were different than the bribes 
charged under the Travel Act.167   
E. THE TRAVEL ACT’S UNANSWERED QUESTIONS  
1. Safe	Harbor	Concerns		
The Travel Act, the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS), and state 
commercial bribery statutes regulate similar actions, which gives rise to 
the fear that the Travel Act will punish actions that the AKS’s statutory 
and regulatory safe harbors protect.168  The AKS’s safe harbor 
provisions were promulgated in response to the concern among health 
care professionals that many seemingly innocuous and, perhaps 
beneficial, commercial arrangements were subject to prosecution under 
the AKS.169  Legal commentators, however, worry that the Travel Act 
erases the safe harbor’s effectiveness in light of the Travel Act’s 
expansive reach.170  Congress initially enacted the AKS to stop “certain 
practices which have long been regarded by professional organizations 
as unethical … and which contribute[d] appreciably to the cost of 
[M]edicare and [M]edicaid programs.”171  However in the 1980s, 
Congress recognized that the AKS may be too broad and was chilling 
legitimate health care arrangements.172  Because of this worry, Congress 
instructed the Department of Health and Human Services to promulgate 
safe harbors to exclude certain beneficial payment practices from 
possible AKS prosecution.173   
As a relatively new prosecutorial tool, health care compliance 
attorneys may not immediately realize how the Travel Act and its 
underlying state commercial bribery statutes are implicated within the 
AKS safe harbor-protected activities. Attorneys who are aware of the 
 
	 166	 Id.  
	 167	 Id. at *58-59. 
	 168	 See 42 U.S.C.	§ 1320a-7(b)(3) (2018); see	also 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2016); “Safe 
harbors” are needed because the federal Anti-Kickback Statute makes certain beneficial 
practices illegal, such as physicians offering discounts to underprivileged and unserved 
communities.  
 169 United States v. Barker, No. 3:16-CR-516-D, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152475, at *22 
(N.D. Tex., Sept. 20, 2017) (quoting 54 Fed. Reg. 3088-01, 3088 (Jan. 23, 1989)).  
 170 Barnett, supra	note 63.  
 171 H.R. REP. NO. 92-231 at 107 (1971).  
 172 S. REP. NO. 100-109, at 27 (1987).  
	 173	 See	42 U.S.C. §1320a-7d(a).  
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overlap between health care statutes and the Travel Act fear that their 
health care provider clients who comply with the AKS may still 
nonetheless violate the Travel Act.174  This is problematic because health 
care providers frequently rely on health care attorneys’ advice 
regarding the AKS’s safe harbor protections, and they subsequently 
engage in protected actions based on this advice.175   
Even if a person acts in accordance with a safe harbor provision, 
the individual may still violate the Travel Act.  In order to violate the 
Travel Act, one must intend	to promote, manage, carry on, or facilitate 
any “unlawful activity.”176  This is a lower mens	rea requirement than 
the AKS’s “knowing and willful” standard, making it possible to violate 
the Travel Act even if one does not violate the AKS or relies on a safe 
harbor-protected payment practice.  For example, the AKS’s safe harbor 
will protect physicians collecting rent for spaces within their practices 
if the rental agreement constitutes a bona	 fide lease under the AKS’s 
regulations.177 If an individual accepts the payment, however, with the 
intent to facilitate an unlawful activity, such as commercial bribery, that 
individual still faces possible criminal prosecution under the Travel Act.  
Prosecutors, however, have discretion in bringing Travel Act charges. As 
such, it may be unlikely that a prosecutor will bring Travel Act charges 
against an individual who has expressed their intent to operate within 
the AKS safe harbor. But, there is still a chance that the Travel Act may 
defeat the purpose of the AKS if the decision to charge a Travel Act 
violation is left solely to prosecutorial discretion.  
As with preemption issues discussed above involving the AKS and 
the Travel Act’s underlying state commercial bribery predicates, health 
care professionals and their attorneys must be aware of all statutes.  
There is nothing in the AKS or its regulations that suggest the AKS is the 
sole and exclusive means of prosecuting corrupt health care payment 
practices.178  Although safe harbors protect individuals from liability 
under	the	AKS, the safe harbors are not a blanket permission to violate 
other laws, including the Travel Act.179  Attorneys often work within the 
framework of multiple statutes applying to their clients’ professional 
ventures, so why should the Travel Act be any different?  
 
	 174	 See Smith, supra note 10; Feld, supra	note 62. 
	 175	 See	generally, Smyer & Falzarano, supra	note 38.  
 176 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2014).  
	 177	 See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2016).  
	 178	 See	United States v. Barker, No. 3:16-CR-516-D, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152475, at 
*30 (N.D. Tex., Sept. 20, 2017.  
	 179	 See	 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3) (2018) (enumerating safe harbors to the AKS 
provisions); 42 C.F.R. 1001.952 (asserting that the following safe harbor-protected 
payment practices should not be treated as criminal offenses under the AKS).   
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2. The	Fiduciary	Problem	
Despite the fact that the Travel Act can function as a gap-filler, the 
statute has not fully addressed all possible corrupt payment schemes. 
Because the Travel Act relies on state commercial bribery statutes, 
Travel Act violations typically require a breach of a fiduciary duty or 
“duty of fidelity.”180  Many doctors may fall under the Travel Act if they 
agree to accept bribes and kickbacks due to the fiduciary duty they owe 
to their patients under state statutes.181  It is difficult, however, to prove 
that certain health care administrators, consultants, and other actors in 
the greater health care system owe a fiduciary duty.182  As such, the 
Travel Act cannot reach those who do not owe a fiduciary duty but 
choose to engage in corrupt remuneration schemes involving private-
payor insurance. Ultimately, this makes the Travel Act narrower than 
the traditional federal Anti-Kickback Statute, which prohibits anyone, 
not just a physician with a fiduciary duty, from participating in illicit 
kickback schemes.183   
 
IV. Conclusion		
This Comment has explored the various implications of the federal 
government’s relatively new and aggressive method of prosecuting 
health care enforcement actions under the Travel Act.  After rigorous 
scrutiny, many fears surrounding the Travel Act are unwarranted.  The 
Travel Act does not give prosecutors unlimited power to pursue all 
prosecutions, including those involving legitimate and proper health 
care arrangements.  Rather, § 1952 extends traditional and well-known 
prosecutorial methods into the private-payor realm.   
Again, § 1952 violations are not just “a veiled attempt by the 
government to add volume-but not substance to its case.”184  The federal 
government and its agencies have a real interest in pursuing private-
payor schemes because Travel Act violations involve interstate facilities 
and important health care systems.  Although health care attorneys may 
fear this seemingly new prosecutorial method, the solution is education.  
 
	 180	 See e.g. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-10 (West 1986) (requiring fiduciary duty); TEX. 
PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.43 (West) (requiring fiduciary duty).  
	 181	 See United States v. Greenspan, No. 2:16-cr-00114-WHW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
108856, at *55-56 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2016). 
	 182	 See e.g. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-10 (West 1986) (listing agents, trustees, guardians, 
physicians, lawyers, accountants, directors, and officers as individuals who owe a duty 
of fidelity). 	
	 183	 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b. 
	 184	 Greenspan, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108856, at *42 (quoting ECF No. 7-12 at 29). 
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It is extremely important for attorneys to analyze and research the 
Travel Act’s  statutory language, along with applicable state commercial 
bribery laws, to best assist their clients in creating compliant health care 
practices. Further legal research and education for attorneys in the 
health care space is especially warranted because the U.S. Attorney 
General’s office has reaffirmed its interest in pursuing health care fraud 
and abuse prosecutions under many different federal statutes.185  
Because the federal government can now aggressively pursue corrupt 
payment schemes involving both government-payor and private-payor 
insurance, a comprehensive understanding of the Travel Act will be 
consequential moving forward.   
 
 
 185 Feld, supra	note 62.  
